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nCTCm TmSNY, Appellant, v. BILLY WILDER
et
Hespondents.
Judgments-Summary Judgments-Issues Precluding Judgment.--'l'he issue to be detPnnined by the trint court in ruling
a motion for summary judgment is whether or not the party
the motion has presented an:~ fncts which
nsP
n triable is~ue or defense, and not to pass on or determine
tnw facts in the case.
[2] !d.-Summary Judgments-Opposing Affidavits.····'r!lC facts
in nffidaYits of the party ag·ninst whom a motion for
summary judgment is made must be accepb•d as tru<:, and
be sufficient such affl(laYits need not
he composed
of
facts.
[ 3] !d.-Summary Judgments-Affidavits.- A summary judgment
proper only if affidavits in support of the moYing pnrty
wnuld he sufficient to sustain a judgment in his fn;;or, nml his
See Cal.Jur.2d, ,Judgments, § 38 et seq.
Dig. References: [1] Judgments, §
Judgment~<.
: fl); [3] Judgments, §Sa (8); ['1] Appeal and Error, § 868;
0, 1:.:-18, 25-27, 29-50, 53, 54, 57] Literary Property: [6]
~ 12:
Property, ~ 1; [19] Actions, § 19: [20] Cnn~ :3; 121·231 Contracts, § 4:
Evidenee, ~ 327; [28]
~ 95; [ 611 Agency, ~ 194; [52] Judgment~, ~ 8n (11) :
Pleading, .~ 273; [.56] Pleading, § 175(1); [58] Appeal and
Ennr. § 62.
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docs not by affidavit or affidavits show such facts
as mav be deemed
the judge
the motion sufficient
to
•
a triabl" issue of fact.
[ 4] Appeal-Briefs.-A
court is not hound to accept
as establishing the law applicable to a
concessions of
case.
Literary Property-Contracts-Consideration.-The act of disan unprotectible
if that act is in fact the bargained-for exchange for a promise, may be consideration to
support the promise.
[6] Contracts-Consent.-One party cannot, by unilateral words or
deeds, thrust on another a contractual relationship unless the
latter has, by his own words or deeds, consented thereto.
[7] Literary Property-Contracts.-An idea which before conveyance has sufficient Yalue to constitute consideration for a
promise to pay its reasonable value does not necessarily and
on disclosure become devoid of value, so that as
a matter of law it cannot support a promise then made to
pay its reasonable value.
[8] !d.-Subject Matter-Ideas.~Generally speaking, ideas are as
free as the air and as speech and the senses, but there can be
circumstances when neither air nor ideas may be acquired
without cost.
[9] !d.-Subject Matter-Ideas.-Ideas are not freely usable by
the entertainment media until the latter are made aware of
them.
[10] !d.-Subject Matter-Ideas.~An idea is usually not regarded
as property, because all sentient lwings may conceive and
evolve ideas throughout the gamut of their powers of cerebration and because our concept of property implies something
which may be owned and possessed to the exclusion of all
other persons.
[11] Property-Constituent Elements.-£ln essential element of
individual property is the legal right to exclude others from
enjoying it; if the property is priYate the right of exclusion
may be absolute, but if the property is affected with a public
interest the right of exclusion is qualified.
[12] Literary Property-Subject Matter-Ideas.-The fact that a
product of the mind has cost its producer money and labor,
and has a value for which otherfl are willing to pay, is not
sufficient to ensure to its producer the right to exclude others
from enjoying it.
[13] !d.-Subject Matter-Ideas.--The doctrine that an author has
a property right in his ideas and is entitled to demand for
[10] See Am.Jur., Literary Property and Copyright, § 5.
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narticn.lar combination of ideas
this must presuppose
or in the form in which ideas are e:m·
be none in the ideas.
"'"··-"'"'·"J''""' Matter-Ideas.-Neither common law nor statu""'~"•·inolh+ extends
to an idea as
only in
of a
work

and seek to

a Hi~>vLJll>;
the difference
eharaeter of the evidenee
and Implied Contracts.-Contracts are either
made in faet or the obligation is implied by law.
conId.-.Expr1ass and Implied Contracts.-If made in
be established by direct evidence or they may be
inferred
eircumstantial evidenee, and in either case
appear to be express contracts; otherwise they, or the preby law.
sumed contractual obligation, must be
Id.-lEixt>reJ>s and Implied Oontraets.-A so-called "impliedin-fact" contract :may be found although there has been no
u't"'"''u;,; of the :minds.
See Oal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 4 et seq.; Am.Jur., Contracts,
seq.
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Evidence-Extrinsic

Evidence.~An

express contract

found where there has been no
of the
under the parol evidence
the contract and,
evidence of a written contract as
:subject to certain exceptions, precludes oral evidence to show
that the minds of the parties did not meet in the
Literary
of an idea can
constitute valuable consideration and can be
for
before it is disclosed to the
but once it is
i. e., disclosed to
it, it is
henceforth his own and he
and use it as
he sees fit.
[26] Id.-Contracts.-In the field of entertainment the producer
may properly and Yalidly agree that he will pay for the service
of conveying to him ideas which are valuable and which he can
put to valuable use.
[27] Id.-Contracts.-Where an idea has been conveyed with
expectation by the purveyor that compensation will be paid if
the idea is used, the producer who has been the beneficiary
of the conveyance of such idea, and who finds it valuable and
is profiting by it, may then for the first time, although he is
not at that time under any legal obligation to do so, promise
to pay a reasonable compensation for such idea-that is, for
the past service of furnishing it to him-and thus create a
valid obligation.
[28] Contracts-Consideration-Past Services.-The moral obligation arising from a benefit of a material or pecuniary kind
conferred on a promisor by past services, rendered in the
expectation that they were to be paid for-or, at least, if
rendered on the assumption by the person rendering them,
thongh mistaken, that they would create a real liability-and,
otherwise, in circmnstances creating a moral obligation on the
promisor's part to pay for the same, will support an executory
promise to do so although there was, previous to such promise,
no legal liability or promise, perfect or imperfect.
[29] Literary Property-Contracts.-Assuming legality of consideration, the idea purveyor cannot prevail in an action to
recover compensation for an abstract idea unless before or
after disclosure he has obtained an express promise to pay, or
the circumstances preceding and attending disclosure, together
with the conduct of the offeree acting with knowledg·e of the
circumstances, show a promise of the type nsually referred to
as "implied" or "implied-in-fact."
[30] Id.-Contracts.-If the idea pnrveyor has clearly conditioned
his offer to convey the idea on an obligation to pay for it if it is
used by the offeree and the offeree, knowing the condition
before he knows the idea, voluntarily accepts its disclosure
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have made an express
called imor under those circumstances the law
will
a

llu:tlu.·acc,

on
on
§ 1584,
that
the consideration
with a proposal, is an acceptance
the proposal," has no application to conveyance of an idea
the offeree has an opportunity to reject the consideration-the proffered conveyance of the idea-before it is
unless the offeree has opportunity to reject he
eannot be said to
Id.-Contracts.-The law will not, from demands stated subse<InEmt to the unconditional disclosure of an abstract
a promise to pay for the idea,· for its use, or for its
~-,,~,_,,~ disclosure.
Id.-Contracts.-The law will not imply a promise to pay
for an idea from the mere facts that the idea has been
is valuable, and has been used for profit, though the
conveyance has been made with the hope or expectation that
obligation will ensue.
Id.-Contracts.-In an action to recover the reasonable value
plaintiff's story for a motion picture by defendants, a eontract to pay for conveyance of an abstract photoplay idea
could not be inferred from plaintiff's disclosure of his basic
idea to the producer's secretary in a telephone conversation
though the mere fact that the idea had been disclosed
would not preclude the finding of an implied (inferred in fact)
contract to pay for a synopsis embodying, implementing and
uu<<p•lllo the idea for photoplay production.
Id.-Defi.nition.-"Literary property" is a general term which
used either to describe the interest of an author (or those
who claim under him) in his works (whether before or after
or before or after copyright has been secured) or
denote the corporeal property in which an intellectual
pr~)dttctiLon is embodied.
Id.-Law Protecting.-Literary property in an intelleetual
is afforded protection by the common law, by
statute pursuant to constitutional authorization (U.S.
art. I, § 8), and by state law (Cal. Civ. Code, § 980).
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Id.-Distinctions.-The basic distinction between the
in
and to
as they may exist at common law
and as they are granted by statutory copyright is that the
common law proteets only a property right while the copyright statute grants a limited monopolistic
!d.-Source of Claim.-Where plaintiff has no statutory copyright to a
his claim for
for
use of such
property
or in contract.
Id.-Remedies.-If plaintiii has a literary
it may
be the subject of a property right and its use by defendants
in a photoplay, if established, could entitle him to remedies
which would be unavailable if he had only an idea to be
appropriated or to be the subject of contract.
[41] Id.-Creation.-Literary property which is protectible may
be created out of unprotectible material, such as historical
events.
[42] !d.-Originality and Novelty.-A literary composition does
not depend on novelty of plot or theme for the status of
"property"; it may be original, at least in a subjective sense,
without being novel.
[43] Id.-Originality.-To he original a literary composition must
be a creation or construction of the author, not a mere copy of
another's work, though the author must almost inevitably work
from old materials, from known themes or plots or historical
events.
[ 44] Id.-Creation.--Creation, in its technical sense, is not essential to vest one with ownership of rights in intellectual property, since a compiler who merely gathers and arranges, in
some concrete form, materials which are opPn and accessible
to all who have the mind to work with like diligence, is as
much the owner of the result of his labors as if his work were
a creation rather than a construction.
[45] Id.-Originality.-While the finished work of an author probably will not be novel because it deals only with the puhlic
domain or public <'O!lllllOns fad~, the finished composition may
be the original product of the researcher who compiles or
constructs it; he gives it genesis, and genesis in this sense
requires qnly origin of the composition, not of the theme.
[ 46] !d.-Contract.-A literary composition may possess value in
someone's estimation and be the subject of contract.
[47] !d.-Right to Use Story or Synopsis.-A motion picture producer and a distributor of films have a right to have their own
employees conduct a research into an historical event in the
public domain and prepare a story based on those facts and
to translate it into a script for a photoplay, but they have no
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of the
him.
!d.-Obligation to Pay for Composition or Idea.·

words
his
use it hut J will not pay you
Id.--Protectibility.-In an action to recover the n•nconahle
it is not
possess
of conan adion to reeover the
J'Pasomlhle value of
:;tory for a photoplay
defendthe mere faet that at the time of plaintiff's flrst telephone
e:lll to the produel,r's office he de:seribed the central itlea of
the story to the SPeretary in respmL'C to hPr insistenee that he
the purpoc;e of his call would nut as a nmtter of law
plaintiff of the
to paymeut fot the story as
diseus:-;ed by him and the
when he again ~poke \Vith
her two days later and at her request read his
to her,
for her to take down in shorthand for def<'lHlants' eonsiderasinee the two eonversations were
of n single transndion and must be eonstrued as sueh.
Agency-Relation Between Principal and Third Person-Imputation of Agent's Knowledge.---lf a se(,retary has authority
to rPeeive and translllit lll<'Soagcs to her employer--such a,;
nwssages offpring to sell n story em hodying a writer's idea for
photoplay-and to take down in shorthand for transmission
to her employer the
of a
she also
has authority to n•ceiv<; and transmit the eonditions and
terms of the offer, and her knowledge of those terms and
conditions is the knowledge of her employer.
[52] Judgments-Summary Judgments--AppeaL-On appeal from
a summary judgnwnt for defendants in an aetion to recover
the reusonahle Yalue of plainiifT':s
Lut' n phiJiuplay by
dPfendants, a eompnrison betwc>en plaintiff'R
of the
and dcfc•ndants' produdion revealed sufflcient similarity
hoth in respect to the historical data and the fictional matm·inl
m·iginnted hy plaintiff as to indieate that n factual issnP, rather
thnn one of Jaw, was rn·esPnted as to wlwther drf'cndnnts usPd
plaintiff's
or denloped their production independently
thPrcof.
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m
domain facts
person or
in the abstract idea of
a
those
facts, but the fact that he used
domain material in
his
and synopsis would afford no justification for defendants to
composition
and use it in the production
a
including the
of a scenario for
without
plaintiff
for the value of his
and the further fact that the basic
idea for the photoplay had been conveyed to defendants before
they saw plaintiff's synopsis would not preclude the finding
of an
(inferred-in-fact) contract to pay for the manuscript, including its implemented idea, if they used such
manuscript.
[55] Pleading-Variance-Immaterial Variance.-In an action to
recover the reasonable value of plaintiff's story for a photoplay
by defendants, the variance between plaintiff's pleading alleging submission of the entire story to defendants and proof
showing submission of only a synopsis did not mislead defendants, it appearing that they, when making their motion for
summary judgment, relied on plaintiff's testimony that he had
submitted his synopsis to them rather than the entire story,
and such variance did not constitute a complete failure of
proof of the general scope and meaning of plaintiff's claim,
but merely a showing that his story was submitted in shorter
form than alleged in the complaint.
[56] Id.-Amendment.-Great liberality is indulged in matters of
amendment to the end that lawsuits may be determined on
their merits.
[57] Literary Property-Pleading-Amendment.-In an action to
recover the reasonable value of plaintiff's story for a photoplay
by defendants, a proposed amendment of the complaint to
show that a synopsis rather than the entire story had been
submitted to defendants would not
rise to a wholly
distinct legal obligation against defendants, but would only
make the pleading conform to plaintiff's testimony as to the
manner in which his story was submitted, and the amendment
should have been allowed.
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Isaac Pacht and Gordon
of
William W. Alsup,
,.,,,,,,vtHL Jr., Louis W. Myers,
B. Nimmer for nespj::m<lertts.
Cruikshank,
L. Gershon as
J.-Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgrendered
him in
action to recover the
rei'iSoname value of a literary composition, or of an idea for a
a synopsis of which composition, embodying the
asserts he
to defendants for
and which
and
plaintiff alleges, were
and used
defendants in producing a photoplay.
case as presented to us is perplexed by
probsome of
appear only upon a composite view of
p1e~aamg:s, the
and the briefs on appeal. Among
"'w'""'"•vvco are these: Is the plaintiff seeking to recover
conveyance 1 of an abstract idea or (b) the sale
there be some who would question use of the word "conveyance"
it is noted that no less an authority than Coleridge
of "words
e.onvey feelings, and words that :dash images."
use in this opinion the term ''conveyance'' seems slightly
aceurate than the word ' 'disclosure.''

0.2d

.)

tl
v
k

F
, Does the
triable issue
available to
To answer the above listed
with any substantial
of confidence
statement of the factual substance of the
of the natnre of the judg.
from and the rules governing our consideration
also with some discussion of the law of ideas,
the law of
property, and the law of contracts as it
relates to transactions
ideas and literary property,
with definitive
of the somewhat differing situations
to which, as descriptive of the "contract" or obligation, some
authorities
the terms ''express,'' ''inferred,'' ''implied
in fact,'' ''
'' or ''quasi-contractual,'' and the
significance of the subjective and objective tests in determining contractual (·xistence under the several pm;sibly pertinent theories.
After threading the maze, we have concluded, for reasons
hereinafter stated, that the summary judgment in favor of
defendants was erroneously granted and should be reversed.
The Pleadings. 'l'he complaint 2 alleges (Count I) that
''Plaintiff conceived, originated and eompleted a certain untitled literary and drainatic composition (hereinafter called
'Plaintiff's Property') based upon the life of Floyd Collins.
Plaintiff has, at all times . . . been, and now is, the sole
. . . owner of Plaintiff's Property, . . . Plaintiff submitted
Plaintiff's Property to the Defendants . . . In making said
submission, Plaintiff stated . . . that it was made for the
purpose of sale of Plaintiff's Property to Defendants to be
used . . . only if Defendants paid to Plaintiff the reasonable
value thereof. Defendants accepted submission of Plaintiff's
Property . . . [Shortly after aceepting submission of plaintiff's property defendants] commeneed the preparation of and
. . . aetually photographed a motion pieture photoplay entitled 'AcE IN Tim HoLE, '[ 31 [and have exhibited the same]
.. At all times [concerned] . . . the Defendants knew ...
2
For brevity, plaintiff's first amended complaint is referred to as the
complaint.
"Assertedly sometimes distributed as ''The Big Carnival.''
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were denied by
defendants filed

moving
in his favor, and . . .
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Contract is
rules above
it appears
record that defendant Wilder at the times
defendant Paramount Pichereinafter referred to as Paraor director, or a combina1949, plaintiff telephoned
Wilder's
, who was also employed
and plaintiff stated that he wished
to see Wilder. At the secretary's insistence that plaintiff
explain his purpose, plaintiff "told her about this fantastic
unusual story. . . . I described to her the story in a few
words. . . . I told her that it was the life
of Floyd
Collins who was trapped and made sensational news for
two weeks . . . and I told her the plot. . . . I described to her
the entrapment and the death, in ten minutes, probably. She
seemed very much interested and she liked it. . . . The main
emphasis was the central idea, which was the entrapment,
this boy who was trapped in a cave eighty-some feet deep.
I also told her the picture had never been made with a cave
background before.'' Plaintiff sought to send Wilder a copy
of the
but when the secretary learned of its length
of some 65 pages she stated that Wilder would not read it,
that he wanted stories in synopsis form, that the story would
first be sent to the
and ''in case they think
it is fantastic and wonderful, they will abbreviate it and
condense it in about three or four pages, and the producers
and directors get to see it.'' Plaintiff protested that he
preferred to do the abbreviating of the story himself, and
the secretary suggested that he do so. Two days later plaintiff, after preparing a three or four page outline of the
story, telephoned Wilder's office a second time and told the
secretary the synopsis was ready. The secretary requested
plaintiff to read the synopsis to her over the telephone so
that she could take it down in shorthand, and plaintiff did so.
During the conversation the secretary told plaintiff that the
story seemed interesting and that she liked it. ''She said
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a
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over with
know." Plaintiff on his
could use the
if
him "the
value of it . . . I made it clear to her that I wrote
ry and that I wanted to sell it.
I
menthat this
was my
which has taken
and therefore if
much effort and research and
used it
will have to pay
it . . .
said
Wilder of Paramount uses
pay you for it.' ''
did not remember whether
conversation with the
anything
first
his purpose of
the story to defendid
~e did not at any time
defendant Wilder.
that one of
authorized functions
was to receive and deliver messages to
and hence, as is developed infra, that on this record
owledge would be his
Plaintiff's only subcontact with the
was a telephone call to her
to
the alleged use of
composition
defendants.
idea in a photoplay produced and exhibited
as hereinafter shown in some detail, closely
both plaintiff's synopsis and the historical material
the life and death of
Collins. It also ina fictional incident whieh appears in plaintiff's synopsis
which he claims is his creation,
in the sense
both original and novel in its combination with the
from the public commons5 or public domain.
Although defendants in their answer deny submission of plainti:B''s
nevertheless defendants state that for
the motion for
nl,,ln·f;ff' did make a subtestimony in his deposition.
mn-nm'i:Arl faet of
submission would
it is not eontested in the making
term "publie commons" is used and defined
of the Los
Bar (of eounsel for
in a paper
in 42
59. Mr. Carman
used the
elements
can under no
""''"avt~ and avoided the more usual
leads to confusion. 'Public
eleJcne11ts, but it includes also any
published works whieh were not initially
by
or on which such
has
in faet
works are
for use
it is not the law
plainti:B' 's
plainti:B' or defendant,
"'"'"""'+" interest is inevitably defeated by the prior existence
works in the 'publie domain.' '' For the purposes
it is, however, unnecessary to observe the distinction
by Mr. Carman.

[4G ''J,2d

Curiae. In his
purposes of
~Submitted by
or original
to be the ba::;is foe n'eovery under the law of plagiarism or
It is conceded that the plaintiff first obtained
the central i<lea or theme of his
, which involves the
entrapment of a man in an
cave and the national
interest
the
rescue
from the
Floyd Collins incident whi<~h occurred in the 1920's.
"It is
's
however, that in
of
the lower court committed reversible error in
granting a summary judgment in this case for the reason
that the summary judgment had the effect of denying the
plaintiff the right to prove that his idea or synopsis was the
subject of a contract wherein the defendants promised to pay
him for it if they used it. It is clear that 'idt>as,' as such,
may still be the
of a contract in California and may
be
as such, evrn though not protectible under the
laws of plagiarism."
Plaintiff also assert,; that he ''is not suing defendants for
plagiarizing his idea bnt is suing defendants because they
agreed to pay him tllP reasonable value of the use of his
idea and story
if they used his idt>a'' and that
"defendants so used plaintiff's idea and synopsis but refused
to pay him as they agrPed. '' But the complaint, as already
that ''Plaintiff conceived, originated and comshown,
pleted [and offered for sale to and defendants accepted submission of and thereafter used] a certain untitled literary
and dramatic eomposition (hereinafter called 'Plaintiff's
Property') based upon the life of Ployd Collins."
If plaintiff is srekillg to recover for a mere abstract,
unprotectible idea, he must meet eertain rules; if he seeks
recovery for a literary composition in which he conceivably
had a property right, the rules are qnite different, as will
subsequently be shown.
It may be that plaintiff's concessions and arguments, 111
the light of the plradings and evidence, are intended to
suggest that there is some nebulous middle area between an
abstract idea and a literary composition, wherein the idea
has been cast in "concrete" form but not "concrete" enough
to constitute a literary property. (See generally, Melville B.
Nimmer of the Los Angeles Bar, writing in 27 So.Cal.L.Rev.
140-144, and cases cited.) However, for the purposes of this
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case
we find it unnecessary and undesirable to recogsuch hybrid, although >ve arc mvare that the
nize
Conrt of the United States has spoken of a "quasi property"
iu news gathered and disseminated by a news seniee
(See International News Service v. Assoc,iatecl Press
8), 248 U. S. 215, 242 [39 S.Ct 68,
63 hEd. 211,
221,
2 A.L.R. 293].) 'rl1e plaiu tiff here, we conclude,
must stand or fall, and this case will be
on rules
to ideas on the one hand or literary property on
the other.
This court, of course, is not bound to accept conof parties as establishing the law applicable to a case.
v. Clark (1901), 133 Cal. 196, 209-210 [ 65 P. 395] ;
v. Bcrniker (1947), 30 Cal.2d 439, 449 [182 P.2d
557] ) It is also to be noted that plaintiff's concession is
iiied by the words ''for purposes of argument.'' Hence,
although plaintiff makes it clear that he is not suing for
"plagiarism or infringement," we feel constrained to the
yiew that in the light of the entire record we cannot disregard
a possible property right interest in the literary composition
as a subJect of contract, express or implied, \vhieh could
afford a basi:,; for recovery.
[5] Defendants concede, as they must, that ''the aet of
diselosing an unprotectible idea, if that aet is in fact the
bargained-for exchange for a promise, may be consideration
to support the promise." They then add, "But once the
idea is disclosed without the protection of a contract, the law
~ays that anyone is free to use it.
Therefore, subsequent
use of the idea cannot constitute consideration so as to
support a promise to pay for such use." And as to the effect
of the evidence defendants argue that plaintiff ''disclosed
his material before . . . [defendants] did or could do anything to indicate their willingness or unwillingness to pay for
the disclosure. The act of using the idea, from which appellant attempts to imply a promise to pay, came long after
the disclosure . . . Accordingly, even if a promise to pay
eonld be found . . . it came after the disclosure had been
made and is therefore unenforceable." The conclusion of
law assPrted in the last sentence, insofar as it might be
applieable to an express (whether proved by dired or by
circumstantial evidence) promise to pay for the S('rvie(• (the
emweyance of the idea) prPvionsly ren(lered from which a
profit has b(•en d<'rived, for reasons which hereinafter appear
pp. 803-804), is not tenable.
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Relative to the

of inferred or
Assoeiation of Motion Picture Proand Four
are eoncerned with the state of the law.
that what
eonceive to be
wherein the Jaw
but
presumes
the
of
which he not
did not
will be confused with
make but
circumstances which evidence actual
but
contracts; i. e., what they appear to consider to be
termed
contracts. [6] They caution us that in a situation such as
''One
cannot
by unilateral words or deeds, thrust upon another a contrac:
tual relationship unless the latter
by his own words or
deeds, consented thereto" and that "In the absence of manifest assent to the same thing upon the same terms by both
parties, there is no contract." \Vith the first of tl1ese cautionary propositions we unqualifiedly agree. Our agreement
with the second, as will hereinafter appear, must depend on
what it meant by ''manifest assent.'' [7] We do not agree
with the further proposition, asserted or implied by defendants
and their related amici, that an idea which before conveyance
has sufficient value to eonstitute consideration for a promise
to pay its reasonable value neeessarily and ipso facto upon
diselosure becomes devoid of value so that as a matter of law
it eannot support a promise then-and only then-made to
pay its reasonable value. A promise, made in advance of
disclosure, to pay for the aet of conveyanee or disclosure
of an idea which may or may not have value is one thing. A
promise, made after conveyance of the idea to the promisor,
to pay reasonable value for an idea which does have value
to the promisor and ,,-hich has been eonveyed to, and has been
used
him is another eontraet, the possible enforeeability
of "\vhieh is discussed infm at pages 803-804.
From what has been indieated above it appears necessary
for us in the proper disposition of this case, having in mind
the problems whieh apparently will eonfront the trial eourt
at a trial on the merits and the duty imposed on us by
seetion 53 of the Code of Civil Proeedure, to consider not
only ( 1) the rules for recovery pertaining to the conveyance
of ideas, as such, but also (2) the question whether the
synopsis of plaintiff's untitled composition eould on any view
of the evidence be deemed entitled to the status of .a literary
property, and (3) the rules defining rights of recovery, so far
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and the senses, and
or drab, as the
and other variables of
}iSt,emlr may combine to
to
or to compreBut there can be circumstances when neither air nor
may be
without cost.
diver who goes
in the sea, even as the pilot who ascends
in the
,,u,LLv"-"· knows full well that for life itself
or someone
must arrange for air (or its respiration-essential
to be specially provided at the time and
of
The theatrical producer likewise may be defor his business life on the procurement of ideas from
persons as well as the dressing up and portrayal of
conceptions ; he may not find his own sufficient for
·vaL [9] As counsel for the Writers Guild aptly say,
''are not freely usable by the entertainment media until
latter are made aware of them.'' The producer may think
idea himself, dress it and portray it ; or he may
either the conveyance of the idea alone or a manuembodying the idea in the author's concept of a literary
giving it form, adaptation and expression. It cannot
that some ideas are of value to a producer.
An idea is usually not regarded as property, because
ideas throughout
sentient beings may conceive aud
of their powers of cerebration and because our
of property implies something which may be owned
po~>sessea to the exclusion of all other persons.
[11] We
as an accurate statement of the law in this respect the
in
language of Mr. Justice Brandeis,
•.nT1'""''n News Service v. Associated Press (1918), supra,
S. 215, 250 [39 S.Ct. 68, 76, 63 L.Ed. 211, 225]: "An
element of individual property is the legal right
elude
from enjoying it. If the property is private,
t of exclusion may be absolute ; if the property is
with a public interest, the right of exclusion is
[12] But the fact that a product of the mind
cost its producer money and labor, and has a value
which others are willing to pay, is not sufficient to ensure
this legal attribute of property. The general rule of
that the noblest of human productions-knowledge,
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after volmt;er<lStJn~
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tlll1ary (~ommunieation to others, free as the air to common
mw. "" [13] Of similar import, but stated negatively: "The
t1oetrine that an author hao: a property right in his ideas
and is entitled to demand for them the same protection which
the law aecords to the proprietor of personal property generally finds no recognition either in the common law or in the
statutes of any civilized country.'' ( 34 Am.,Jur. 402-403, § 5 ; 18
C.,J.S. 143, § 10e; cf. Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc. (1950),
35 Cal.2d 690, 693-697, 702, 711-712 [221 P.2d 95] ; Burtis v.
Universal Pictures Co., Inc. (1953), 40 Cal.2d 823, 831 [256
P.2d 933] ; Kurlan Y. Col1tmbia Broadcasting System
(1953), 40 Cal.2d 799 [256 P.2d 962].) [14] Whether the
theory upon which this court sustained recovery in the Golding
case may properly be classed as a property rights theory is not
clear (see pp. 694-695 of 35 Cal.2d and pp. 831, 836-837 of 40
Cal.2d) but it is clear that California does not now accord
individual property type protection to abstract ideas. ( W eitzcnkorn v. Lesser 7 (1958), 40 Cal.2d 778, 788-789 [256 P.2d
947].) This accords with the general weight of authority.
(See generally, Nimmer, "The Law of Ideas," (1954) 27 So.
Cal.J_..Rev. 120 et seq. and cases cited.) [15] "There may
be literary property in a particular combination of ideas [and
this must presuppose an expression thereof] or in the form
in which ideas are embodied. There can be none in the
idras." (Fendle1· v. JJiorosco (1930), 258 N. Y. 281, 287 [171
N.E. 56, 58].) [16] Neither common law nor statutory
copyright extends protection to an idea as such. '' [ 0] nly
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"The general rule as stated by Justice Brandeis is not disputed in the
majority opinion but the latter recognizes what is termed a "quasi
property'' right in news gathered by the respective competing agencies
(see p. 73 of 39 S.Ct. [248 U. S. 215, 250, 63 L.Ed. 211, 225]) and
resolves the case on theories applicable to unfair competition.
7
For development of the current state of the law in California and the
somewhat differing and evolving views of the justices see Golding v.
R.K.O. Pictures (1949), snpra, (Cal.) 208 P.2d 1, 7; id. on rehearing, 35 Cal.2d 690, 701, 710 [ 221 P.2d 95]; Stanley v. Colu-mbia Broadcasting Syste-m (1949), (Cal.) 208 P.2d 9, 17; id. on rehearing,
35 Cal.2d 653, 668, 672 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216]; Weitzenlcorn v.
Lesser (1953), supra, 40 Cal.2d 778, 795; Kurian v. Columbia Broad·
casting Systen! (1953), snpm, 40 Cal.2d 799, 811, 812, 815; Burtis v.
Universal Pictures Co., Inc. (1953), s1.1pra, 40 Cal.2d 823, 835, 837.
It is to be noted that the opinion of Justice Edmonds in the Weitzen·
korn ease, sometimes referred to as the majority opinion, has the full
concurrence of but two other justices (Chief Justice Gibson, and .J ustiee
Shenk), with a limited concurrence by Justice Schauer. Justices Traynor
and Spence concur only in the judgment and Justice Carter dissents.
However, any portions of the vVeitzenkorn opinion quoted herein as
holdings of the court, or cited with approval, are to be understood as
now having the concurrence of a majority of the court.
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'of a copyrightecl work does any mouopol:·
the 'thPnH',' the 'plot,' the 'ideas' may alway:-; bn
borrowed.'' (Dellar v. Sarnuel (}oldwyn, Inc. ( 184fi,
A.), 150 F.2d 612.)
principles aboYe stated do not, howewr, lead to th<'
that ideas cannot hP a subject of contract. [17] As
:Hr. ,Justice Traynor stated in his dissenting· opinion in
v. Columbia BToadcnsfing
(1D:30'i. snpra, 35
Cal
653, 67 4: '' rrhe policy that precludes protection of
nn abstract idra by eopyright docs not prevent its proi ection
!J,· •·1.mtract. Even though an idea is not propnty subject
t<~ exe1 nsiye ownership, its disclosure may be of substantial
to the person to whom it is disclosed. That c1isc1osnre
ma,1· therefore be consideration for a promise to pay . . .
Ewn though the idea disclosed ma)· be 'widely known and
genurally understood' [citation], it may be protretrrl by an
express contract providing that it will be paid for n·gardless
uf
lack of llOYelty." (Ct. Brunner v. Sti:J:, Baer cf- Puller
Co. (1044), :)52 :\lo.l22G [181 S.\V.2c1 G-13, 646]; Schrmwald v.
P. Bud:ai't Jlfg. Co. (JD47), 8:5G lVIo. 43:3 [202 S.W.2d 7].)
"\miei supporting plaintiil' add, "H a studio wislws to have
an idPa diseloserl to it and finds that idea of sufficient value
to make use of it. it is difficult to se\' how any hardship is
inYolved in requiring payment of the reasonable value of the
matel'ial submitted." 'l'he pt·ineiples enunciated in the abow
qnot at ion from Justice Traynor's dissent are accept eel as the
law of California (!Veifzenkorn v. Lesser (1953), supra, 40
Cal.2d 778, 791-7~J2) and \H' haw 110 quarrel \vith ill<Jiei 's
posin lation. Tb is (:ase, howl'Vl'r, rrmaim; to be resol vecl.
Tile lawyer or doctor vvho applies specialized kJIO\YledgP
to a state of facts and give~ advice for a fee is selling and
cotrn:ying an idea. In doiHg that hP is rendering a serviee.
The lawyer and doctor have no propl'rt~- rights in their
as ;;uch, but they do not ordinarily eonvey tht•m •vithont
solieitation by elient or patient. "Csually the parties \\·ill
rxpn•ss1y contraet for the [H'rformam:e of and payment for
such services, but, in the abscnee of an express contme1.
when the scrviee is requested and rtmdered the law does not
ht•silate to i11fer or impl,\· a peomise to <:ompensate for it.
!Rre Buck v. C1'ty of Enreka (Ul9!)), 124 Cal. 61, fi6 [5fi P.
Gl2i; Zunlll'alt v. Sr:hw!lrz ( tr}:n), 112 Cal.App. 7a+, 7:W
l2fJ7 1'. GOHI; People's Not. Br1ilk v. Oeistlwrdt (18!liij, :J:,
:Jrb, 2:l2, 2:17-2:!8 [75 N.\V. 582]; 6 Cal..Jnr.2d 378, § 181;
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5 Am.Jur.
§ 153; 41 Am.Jur. 256, § 142; 7 C.J.S. 1078,
§ 190
; 70
1023, § 68; see also
v. Rumsey
(1938), 12 Cal.2d 334, 341-342
P.2d 146].) In other
words: the recovery may be based on contract either express
[18] The person who can and does convey a
or
who commercially solicits the
valuable idea to a
service or who
that it is
tendered for a
should likewise be entitled to recover.
In so
we do not fail to
that free-lance
writers are not necessarily members of a learned profession
and as such bound to the exalted standards to which doctors
and lawyers: are dedicated. So too we are not oblivious of the
hazards with which producers of the class represented here
by defendants and their related amici are confronted through
the unsolicited submission of numerous scripts on public domain materials in \vhich public materials the producers
through their own initiative may well find nuclei for legitimately developing the ''stupendous and colossal.'' [19] The
law, however, is dedicated to the proposition that for every
wrong there is a remedy ( Civ. Code, § 3523) and for the sake
of protecting one party it must not close the forum to the
other. It will hear both and seek to judge the cause by
standards fair to both. To that end the law of implied contracts assumes particular importance in literary idea and
property controversies.
The Law Pertaining to Contracts, Express, Implied-in-Fact
and Implied by Law, ancl Quasi Contractual Obligations, as
Related to Ideas and Literary Property. The parties and
amici, from their several viewpoints, discuss the law of
contracts and caution us not to confuse the rules insofar
as such rules may differentiate respectively among contracts
which are express or implied-in-fact or implied-in-law, meaning by the latter expression to denote a quasi-contractual oblilation imposed by law. vVe agree that whether a contract
be properly identified as express or as implied-in-fact or
inferred from circumstances ; or whether the bargain meets
the subjective test of a meeting of minds or is held to reside
in the objective evidence of words and acts with or without
a meeting of minds; or whether the obligation be recognized
as implied by law from acts having consensual aspects (and
therefore often termed implied-in-fact) ; or whether the obligation be imposed by law because of acts and intents which,
although tortious rather than consensual, should in justice
give rise to an obligation resembling that created by contract
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are established"; see also Silva v.
Oakland
, 14 Cal.2d 762, 773
rev.
vol. 1, p. 8.)
The same author describes quasi contracts by declaring that
"
contractual obligations are imposed by the law for
the purpose of bringing about
without reference to the
of the parties, the
apparent restriction upon
the ]lO\Yer of the law to create such obligations is that they
mnst be of such a sort as would have been appropriately
mf•m·ed under common-law procedure by a contractual action.
IJHked even this limitation is too narrow, for a bill in equity
libel in admiralty might be the appropriate means of
some quasi contractual obligations. As the law
ma:>· impose any obligations that justice requires, the only
limit in the last analysis to the category of quasi contracts is
that the obligation in question more closely resembles those ereated by contract than those created by tort. On the other
a true contract cannot exist, however desirable it might
have one, unless there is a manifestation of assent to
of a promise. Furthermore, the measure of damages appropriate to contractual obligations differs from that
to quasi contracts . . . It is also true that quasi
cmli ractual obligations are not so universally based on unjust
enri(·hment or benefit as is sometimes supposed. 8 There are
many cases where the law enforces in a contractual action a
to restore the plaintiff to a former status-not merely
to snrrender the benefit which the defendant has received."
1 lt were not for precedent we should hesitate to speak
of
implied-in-fact contract. [21] In truth, contracts are
do <:trine of un juHt enrichment is regarded as usually
rec\,Yery in quasi contractual situations.
(See Jfatarese
JJcConnack Lines (1946, C.C.A.2d), 158 F.2d 631, ()31;
Col11mbia Broadcasting System (1950), supra, 35 Cal.2d
Traynor, J., dissenting.)

underlying
v. MooreStanley v.

653, 675,
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c~ither

made in faet or the obligation is implied in law.
[22] 1f made in
contracts may be established by direct
eYidence or they may be inferred from circumstantial evidenee. The only difference is in the method of proof. In
l~ither ca:w they won1d apprar to be express eontract::;. Otherwise, it wonld sePm that they, or the presumrd contractual
obligation, must be implied at law. [23] A so-called "implied-in-fact" contract, howeyer, as the term is used by some
writers, may be found although there has been no meeting
of the minds. [24] Even an express contract may be found
where there has been no meeting of minds. The classic example of this situation is set up by the parol evidence rule.
The law aeeepts the objective evidence of the written contract
<ls constituting the contract and, subject, of course, to certain
exceptions, precludes oral evidence to show that the minds
of the parties did not meet in the writing. Professor \Villiston
recognizes in effeet, if not specifically, that the law implies
(or eonstrues) contractual obligations in many cases where
there is no trne contract in the historically conventional sense
and that such implied obligations are of the nature of, and
governe(1 by the rules applicable to, contracts termed impliedin-faet by many writers. In a paper published in 14 Illinois
Law HeYicw 85, 90, Mr. \Villiston says: "The parties may
be bonnd by the terms of an offer Pven though the offeree
expressly indicated dissent, provided his action could only
lawfully mean assent. A buyer who goes into a shop and
asks and is given [told] the price of an article, cannot take
it and say 'I decline to pay the price you ask, but will take
it at its fair value.' He vYill be liable, if the seller elects to
hold him so liable, not simply as a converter for the fair value
of the property, bnt as a buyer for the stated price." (See
Lucy v. Mouflet (1860), 5 H. & N. 229, 232; Wilcox, Ives
& Co. v. Rogers (1913), 13 Ga.App. 410 [79 S.E. 219]; Rest.,
Contracts. § 5, p. 7; § 72(2), p. 77.) Concerning the same
subject ProfesRor Co:-;tigan, in a paper published in 33 Harvard Law Review 376, at 398, states his view: "Professor
\Villiston is absolutely right in his contention that the nomeeting-of-the-minds expr('Ss contracts-the obj(•ctive but not
subjective test contracts-are properly to be denominated
c-ontracts instead of quasi-contracts, and the reason for that
concession >Yas that on their breach the normal contract
measure of damages is applied. But that same reason has led
us to the further conclusion that there are genuine implied-
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From what has been shown
the law of
and of contracts we
that conveyance of an
can constitute
and can be barit is disclosed to the proposed purchaser,
i. e., disclosed to him and he has
46 C.2d-24
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,J

own and
may work with
In the field of
C(

the
if the idea is used
who has been the bene:
of such an
and who finds it
valuable
is
may not then for the first
he is not at that time under any legal obligato pay a reasonable compensation for
for the past service of furnishing it to
him-and thus create a valid obligation. [28] As said in
12 American
603, section 110, "there is considerable authority which supports the view that the moral
from a benefit of a material or pecuniary
obligation
kind conferred upon the promisor by past services, rendered in
the expectation that
iYere to be paid for-or, at least.
if rendered upon the assumption by the person rendering
them, though mistaken, that they would create a real liability
-and, otherwise, in circumstances creating a moral obligation
on the part of the promisor to pay for the same, will support
an executory promise to do so, although there was, previous
to such promise, no legal liability or promise, perfect or imperfect." (See also Civ. Code,
1605, 1606, quoted s~lpra,
p. 802; Edson v. Poppe (1910), 24 S.D. 466 [124 N.W. 441,
26 L.R.A.N.S. 534] ; Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (1895),
167 Pa. 569 [31 A. 925, 46 Am.St.Rep. 691] ; Gray v. Hamil
(1889), 82 Ga. 375 [10 S.E. 20:5, 6 L.R.A. 72] ; Credit Bureau
of San Dz:ego v. Johnson (1943), 61 Cal.App.2d Supp. 834,
839 [142 P.2d
; 17 A.L.R. 1366-1371, s. 79 A.L.R 1354;
53 L.R.A. 371-376; 26 L.RA.N.S. 526.) [29] But, assuming legality of consideration, the idea purveyor cannot
prevail in an action to recover compensation for an abstract
idea unless (a) before or after disclosure he has obtained an
express promise to pay, or (b) the circumstances preceding
and attending disclosure, together with the conduct of the
offeree aeti11g with knowledge of the circumstances, show a
promise of the type usually referred to as ''implied'' or
"implied-in-fact. " 9 (See W eitzenkorn v. Lesser (1953), su"Such "implied" or "implied-in-faet" contracts are, we think, more
accurately described as express contracts proved by circumstantial evidence.
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used

the eom1itiom; on which it is tendered.
he
of the eon>iilc·n,tion offered IYith a proposal, is an aceeptanee of the
") ean have no applieation unless the offeree has an
to rcjeet the consideration--the
eonveynJwe of the idea-before it is
Unless the offeree has
nppor1 nnity to reject he cannot be said to
(cr.
Y. Ji'orbalh (
, 5 Cal.App.~d Snpp. 767, 769-770
.2d 108]; County of Ventura v. Southern Calif. Edison
048), 85
5:12 [193 P.2•1 512]; Krum v.
(1948), 22 Ca1.2d 1B2, 135 [J37 P.2c118].) The idea
mm1 who blurts out his idea without having first made his
has no one bnt himself to blame for the loss of his
pmver. [33] The law will not in any
fro!!; demands stat(•(!
to the unconditioned disdosnre of an abstract
imply a
to pay for thr
idea. for its use, or for its previous disclo~urr. [34] The
law will not impl~· a promise to pay for an idea from the mere
fa(% that the idea bas been eonyeyed, is
and has
bren m:ed for profit; this is trne rycn
the eom·e.nmc:e
lt<J~ bePn ma(le \Yith the hope or (~xpeetation that some oblig'a1irm ''··ill ens1w. So, if the plaintiff here
only
for 11w conyeyanre of the iclea of making a dramatic produciion nui of the life of
Collins he mnst fail unJe,,s in
with the above stated rules he can establish a
contnwt to pay.
Fnnll plaintiff's
as epitomize(l a how ( pp.

tion 1584 of the Civil Code ("

b

elusion.
accepted
it upon the terms on which he had offered it 1 Certainly the mere fact that the idea had been disclosed under the
circumstances shown here would not
the finding of
an implied
in
contract to pay for the synopsis
embodying, implementing and
the idea for photoplay
production.
The Law
[36] "Literary
a
term which is used either to
describe the interest of an author
those who claim under
him) in his works
before
after publication or
before or after copyright has been
or to denote the
in which an intellectual production is
K"""'"r's Law Diet.
, p. 731; 34 Am.Jur.
§
[37]
property in an
is afforded protection by the common
law
v. Limeriean
Co. (
C.C.A.
2d), 134 F. 321, 68 L.R.A. 591 ; see also 34 Am.J ur. 405-406,
§ 8), by federal statute
to constitutional authorization
U. S.
art. I, § 8; see also title
U. S. Code;
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus
, 210 U. S.
346 [28
S.Ct.
state
(
Civ. Code,
§
and to
and as
common

I
c
n
a
l
fi

ic
I
p

c
s

m
111

a
al

tb

ec
w

in
gathers
and arranges, in some concrete
materials which are
open and accessible to all who have the mind to work with like
is as much the owner of the result of his labors
as if his vvork were a creation rather than a construction."
Am.Jnr.
§ 12 see also 23 A.L.R.2d 265; Amdur on
69§ 3; Fred
Inc. v.
(1924),
150-161 Jewelers' Mercantile
v. Jewelers'
Pttb. Go.
) , 155 N. Y. 241 [49 N.E. 872, 41
63 Am.St.Hep.
; Booth & Hanford Abstract
Go. v.
(1894), 8 Wash. 549 [36 P. 489, 23 L.R.A. 864,
40 Am.St.Hep. 921] ; Leon Loan & Abstract Go. v. Equalization Board (1892), 86 Iowa 127 [53 N.W. 94, 17 L.R.A. 199,
41 Am.St.Hep. 486]; Dart v. Woodhmtse (1879), 40 Mich.
399 [29
544].)
\Vriting
portraying characters and events and emotions with words, no less than with brush and oils-may be an
art which expresses personality. Accordingly, the language
of Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court in
a copyright case relating to circus posters is apropos: ''Others
are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the
copy . . . The copy is the personal reaction o£ an individual
upon nature. Personality always contains something unique.
It expresses singularity even in handwriting, and a very
modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which
is one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless
there is a restriction in the words of the act." (Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Go. (1903), 188 U.S. 239, 249-250
[23 S.Ct. 298, 47 L.Ed. 460].) As indicated, the theme of a
writer must almost inevitably be neither novel nor original.
[45] The finished work probably will not be novel because
it deals only with the public domain or public commons
facts. But the completed composition may well be the original
product of the researcher who compiles or constructs it. He
gives it genesis, and genesis in this sense requires only
origin of the composition, not of the theme. The composition
will be the property of the author. Whether it possesses substantial value, and to what extent, if any, it may be entitled
to copyright protectibility, may be quite another matter.
The time of the author; his resourcefulness in, opportunity for and extent o£, research; his penetration in perception and interpretation of source materials; the acumen of
his axiological appraisals of the dramatic; and his skill and
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conceivestimation and be the
it may be considered
scientific or any
the
used someone 's
in preand producing their photoplay. That script must have
ue to them. As will be hereinafter shown, it
plaintiff's synopsis. [47] Ergo, plaintiff's synopto be a valuable literary composition. Defendan unassailable right to have their own
the research into the Floyd Collins tragedy-an
event in the public domain-and prepare a story
on those facts and to translate it into a script for the
But equally unassailable (assuming the verity of the
which plaintiff asserts) is plaintiff's position that dehad no right-exeept by purchase on the terms he
acquire and use the synopsis prepared by him.
The proposition which seems to be implicit in some of
contentions of defendants and their related amici-that
to whom a literary composition or idea is offered
sale for its reasonable value if used, may state that he
not agree to purchase the proffered literary composition,
idea for one, until he knows what the composition or idea
may then, when it is submitted to him on those terms,
it and say, in words or by his acts, "Yes, it is invaluable and I shall use it but I will not pay you for
because now I have it"-does not commend itself to us.
n ....,.ro,"•<•... is not commercially soliciting, and is not willing
an obligation to pay for, valuable ideas, or for comadapting and implementing them, which ideas and
po:sit:tOTILS are offered to be conveyed only upon the assumpof such an obligation, he does not need to read manuwhich he knows are submitted on those
or to
his secretary take dictated synopses of stories offered
conditions, and then use them. (See Elfenbeirn v.
Terminals, (1933), supra, 111 N.J.L. 67 [166
93} ; cf. Matarese v. llfoore-McOormick Line;s (1946,

appears
must
that there is triable issue of
: Did
to the defendants for sale
knowing
that it \Yas offered to
use that
composition or any
If so, what was the reasonable value of the cornnosinon
[ 49] It is not essential to recovery that
or synopsis possess the elements of
if the fact of consensual contract be
v. Lesser
, supra, 40 Cal.2d
can we hold, on the state of the
synopsis is devoid of the clements neces;;;ary to
measure of such
. ·while the trial
or an
appellate court on a sufficient record, may determine the
specific extent of an author's nY'.nn,n''T"
in any particular
work
v. Universal Pictures
45 F.2d 119,
on this appeal to'
define the limits more
been done,
supra, pages 806-808
also
The Law Applied to the Facts.
as conceded by defendants for purposes of their summary judgment motion,
plaintiff, in accordance witb his
submitted his
synopsis to them through defendant Wilder's secretary and
such submission included a declaration by both plaintiff and
the secretary that defendants were to pay for his story if
they used it. [50] The mere fact that at the time of plaintiff's first
call to Wilder's office he described the
central idea of the
to the
in response to her
insistence that he
the purpose of his call would not as
a matter of law
plaintiff of the
to
for
the story as discussed by him and the
spoke with her two
later and at her
read his
synopsis to
for her to take down in shorthand for de·

as mesa writer's idea for
to take down in shorthand for transmission
the
she also ""'""''"cu
to reeei ve and transmit the conditions and terms
Her
of tho:::e terms and conditions is
(
§ 2332 ; Chap(1955), 45 Ca1.2d
802 [291
see also Civ.
§ 3521: "He who takes the
benefit must bear the bur(len. ") On this issue the evidence
synopsis reached desupport a
that
and that they are chargeable
through the
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the conditi011s on which the synopsis was
offered.
~With

to whether defendants used plaintiff's comit may be first noted that defendants presented no
affidavits m any \vay denying such use, but merely exhibited
their
to the court for purposes of comparison beand defendants'
Dehveen
fendants also produced extracts from a
paper to which plaintiff had already
testified in his
that he had referred in preparing his story. A
the photoplay was, however, attached to plaintiff's
as an exhibit, and plaintiff has provided an outline
his synopsis 10 with defendants' scenario. DeSynopsis: Plaintiff's synopsis of his story, submitted
Wilder's secretary as related hereinabove, stated that the
''story deals with the sensational and tragic end of Floyd Collins who
lost his life in a cave in Ky. in 1925 and held the whole nation in
. . . Since 1925 to the beginning of World War II only the
stories . . . have outdone the Collins story for sustained interest. F.
lived with his family in a cave region of Ky . . . . It was
nndcrneath his f>tther's farm where F. C. discovered the great Crystal
Cnve in 1Dl7. Collins was abscessed with cave exploration since his boyhood. He gained reputation for discovering many relics left by the
Indinns which he sold to the tourists . . . F. was very much in love
1vith a girl named Alma . . . In the spring of 1918 the Crystal Cave
was opened for commercial tourists trade . . . On January 30, 1925, F.
was on his way to enter a narrow aperture, his last excursion into the
cave land. In all his previous trips Floyd had learned to fear a huge
boulder weighing approximately 100 lbs. which was held in
point downward, by a small wedge rock, for he knew it
if he should brush against it. The joy of his new discovery
ovcTcnme his natural caution. The heavy heel of his new boots struck
tho rock wedge. Down it crashed with the speed of a lightning flash,
falling across his loft ankle nnd pinioning both legs, for his right leg
had been douhled beneath the left. He was held prisoner . . . F 's
father . . . spread the alarm. Telephones were busy . . . and soon the
whole countryside was aroused . . . The first reporter to reach F. was
William Burke :\Tiller . . . [who told Collins] 'The world is coming,
old man,' . . . F. told the reporter of a horrifying dream he had had,
and he feared the curse of the dead Indians for having disturbed their
graves. fThe idea of the dreams and fears of the trapped man with
to a curse of dead Indians was fictional or original with plaintiff,
than historical fact.] . . . Lieutenant Burdon from the Louisville
Ji'ire Department who was led to F. by . . . Miller, . . . said, 'There
is only one way to save Collins without maiming him, and that is to
sink a shaft to him.'
''A stream of machines and men was moving down the clay road
. . . Opposition develops between the natives and the rescue crew. . . .
An ugly situation was imminent.
'''!'he Louisville Conrier-J ournal was bringing the F. C. sensational
news every day on the front page. v'V. Burke Miller's acceptance of
danger was instigated, by the lure of Pulitzer Prize which later was
awarded to him. Cave City was rapidly taking on the appearance of a
Klondike gold rush town. . .. Miller was the only reporter who saw
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brief have likewise outlined

Caw
as a picnic . . . . b' 's
''The shaft was sinking steadily toward the cavern.
Extremely suspicions accusations were made by some
to
of
C. Gov. Field summoned the Bonnl
was also directed to run down a most unfortunnte
by two reporters who considered the "lvhole
scheme and a hoax . . . '' The story ends with
the

' Photoplay ScenaTio: Prom material
defendants, it appeal'S that. the scenario of
also commences with a mention of
over the Atlantic,'' and referring to
''The guy pinned way down in the cave.
that ever broke. Front IJage on every paper in
'' Defendants state in their brief that their
purport to be a biogr::tphy of the life of Floyd
1wlers, plot and deYelopment are wholly imaginative. Its theme is to
what might have happened to a group of . . . fictional cllarneters
if they hnd come into contact with a sitnation similar to the
Collins incident of ] 925.''
to defenrbnis' descrintion of their
clwraetcr is Charles Tatum, a repoi·ter for a newspaper
Xew ::\Iexico. Tatum had oneo lleen a big·time
now down on his luck nnd looking for an
former prominent position. \Vhile traveling
at a roadside stand and finds that Leo ::\finosa,
has just been trapped in an old Indian cliff
recognizes in this event a chance to m·eate an
to the Floyd Collins incident and to exploit it in his own selfish interest.
Playing on the greed of the local sheriff and of the
mmt 's wif<>,
Tntnm succeeds in getting the exclusive right to
the ra,·e and
inten·icw the victim, who expresses fear of '' 'l'he Indian dead. They 'ro
an 11round here. 'l'his is a tomb . . . with mummies four hundred years
old.'' Tatum contrives to prolong the rescue opemtion so ns to inr~casc
pnhlic interest in the affair and thus increase the yalue of liis exelnsive
(H·counts of the event. He builds tho affair into a horrible camin!l of
cheap publicity, pandering to the morbid curiosity of the public. He
exncts enormous fees for his exclusive stories of the
alHl
rescue operntions and his two selfish, inlnnmm assistnnts
and the wife) avidly grasp at the profit to be mnde from the
up. The only difficulty is that the rescac operntion is
and the trapped man dies. 'ratum is left with the
careless disregard of consequences has made him in cffcet a
He falls out with the wife and sheriff and is himself killerl.

Indian

Minos a
Curio
Minosa
ist trade.

to tour-

in excave
flat slab
wall of his
slanted across
him down.
Minosa 's father calls sheriff.

oner.

1HlLU1ae;

Tatum is
to
arrive ; tells Minosa not to
you
worry, as "
out.''

Local miners
is unnecessary.

that

Tatum comments that the
As big
Maybe
than
Collins,''
refers to
that reporter on Collins
received a Pulitzer Prize.
Carnival trucks are deand persons
COJllCt)SSlOilS are shown; excursion train is referred to resand
used.

Collins' father
alarm.
Miller is first reporter to
reach
and tells him,
''The world is coming, old
man.''
Lt. Burdon says, ''There is
only one
to save Collins
without
him, and
that is to sink a
to him."
develops between the natives and the
rescue crew.
Collins story carried on
page of Louisville newspaper every day; Miller was
later awarded Pulitzer Prize.

.)!

is apparent from
com~
and l'rom the outlineR which are
that
rather than one

that t!lis conrt view the
(lt•fr·ndants 111 their brief offer to mab~
in orc\er to fl\'tennine wlwther
triable i;.;sne of
The scope of th(~
in that
to 11s tl1at tlh• issues lwrt• arn llOt fpr swnmary
1n the
of the eonclusions
have reached
evidenee
disenssed it appcm·s that
the
woulcl relate nwrely to the weight of the evidence.

J
a
to
At the trial the trier of fact should proceed with nicety
the evidence to resolve the
of discrimination in
Inasmuch as plaintiff's story is taken from
and that of defendants
substance
accurate, it must be
borne in mind that the mere facts that plaintiff submitted
and offered to sell to defendants a synopsis containing public
domain material and that thereafter defendants used the same
domain material, will not support an inference that
defendants promised to pay for either the synopsis or for
the idea of using the public domain material. [54] The
can have no property right in the public domain
Floyd Collins or in the abstract idea of
a photoplay dramatizing those facts. On the
other
the fact that plaintiff used the public domain
material in constructing his story and synopsis would afford
no justification whatsoever for defendants to appropriate
plaintiff's composition and use it or any part of it in the
production of a photoplay-and this, of course, includes the
writing of a scenario for it-without compensating plaintiff
for the value of his story. And the further fact, if
it be a fact, that the basic idea for the photoplay had been
conveyed to defendants before they saw plaintiff's synopsis,
would not preclude the finding of an implied (inferred-incontract to pay for the manuscript, including its implemented idea, if they used such manuscript.

The Complaint; Failure of Proof, or Variance; Amendment.
Defendants urge in support of the summary judgment that
in plaintiff's amended complaint he alleges a contract by defendants to pay him if they used his entire 65-page
story based upon the life of Floyd Collins, plaintiff's testimony is that such story was actually never submitted to
uefendants, but rather only the synopsis thereof, and that
therefore there was a complete failure of proof. Plaintiff,
following entry of the summary judgment, moved the court
for au order setting aside the judgment and permitting
plaintiff to file an amendment to his amended complaint,
alleging submission of the synopsis inst<:>ad of the 65-page
story. The motion was denied and defendants argue that
the amendment would have substituted a different cause of
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statute of limitations had
of

to his
m maul
upon the merits. \Vhenever
the eourt may
been so
amended upon sueh terms as may be
Section 470
that "\Vhere the variance i:;: not
m:
last
the court may direct the faet to be fonncl
or may order an immediate amend~
to the
Section 4 71 : ''
the
is unproved, not in some particular or
but in its
scope and
it is not to be
a ease of variance, within the last iwo
but
a failure of proof."
'l'he variance between plaintiff's
in
present case obviously did not mislead
since \Yhen making their motion for summary
relied upon his testimony that he had submitted his s.nwpsis
to
rather than the entire 65-page story. (See Chclini
,-.
(1948), 32 Cal.2cl480, 486 [19G P.2d 915].)
sm·h a variance clearly did not constitute a
of
of the general scope and meaning of plaintiff's claim,
but merely a showing that his story was submitted in shorter
than that alleged in the complaint.
[56] Great liberality is indulged in matters of amendment
to the end that lawsuits may be determined upon their merits.
Il.lopstock v. Superior Court (1941), 17 Cal.2d
19-20
P.2d 906, 135 A.L.R. 318], and cases there cited.) In
tht' Klopstock case it was dedared that ''In determining
whether a wholly different cause of action is introdnced by
the amendment technical considerations or ancient formulae
are not controlling nothing more is meant than that the
defendant not be required to answer a wholly different
1
or obligation from that originally stated. .As the
eomt says in . . . [Frost v. Witter ( 1901), 132 Cal.
426
P. 705, 84 Am.St.Rep. 53)], for the purpose of determinwhether amendment is possible, the 'cause of aetion'
ref('rred to as furnishing the test means only the
obligation which it is sought to enforce against the defendant.
Other courts have used almost identical language; the test

make
as to the
manner in which his
was submitted to defendants. It
for defendants' claimed use of the same
as that althat
still would be
recovery
under the
Such amendment
have been allowed.
Plaintiff has also
to
from an order
his motion to set aside the summary
and
him to file an amendment to his amended complaint.
Such order is not appealable, and the attempted
therefrom will be dismissed. (See Bank
America v. Oi~ Well
Co.
12 Cal.App.2d 265, 271
P.2d 885];
' 121
834-835
appeal
plaintiff's
motion to set aside the summary
him
to file the amendment to his amended
is dismissed.
The
is affirmed as to the second and third counts
of the complaint, but as to the first count it is reversed and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
"With the views
in this
and Methe result reached in the
the
discussion of numerous
of law wholly inand unnecessary to a determination of this matter.
purpose
served
such a discussion other than
to confuse the reader and the future state of the law so far as
this
of
is concerned and other cases in general inI had
it the policy

of

t

to be
a motion for a
triable issues of
had
and dramatic eomposion the condition that

anr1 dramatic
therefor. \Vhether
had
's
showed ihat p1aintiff
with ilw expectation
and dramatic
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were all questions of fact for the trier of
In
other
the defendants' motion for summary judgment
And the
function of
was
court is to review the action of the trial court in granting
that summary
other words, to determine
whether or not triable issues of fact existed. But a majoritv
of this court has seen fit not
to take
•
of
but to set forth learned discussions of inlaw and then direct the trier of fact at the new
trial as to how it should perform its function in the judicial
field.
Taking into consideration the
of the majority
opinion, there is no necessity of here reiterating the evidence
plaintiff's submission of his literary work to defendant ·wilder's secretary. We all are aware, I believe,
that ideas may be taken from the public domain and woven
into a plot, or story, which may present something new,
different, and of value to one in the market for such merchandise. It does not require interminable discussion of how
many plots there are, nor of what some writers have considered as plots, nor of the services rendered by doctors,
lawyers, dentists and the like, to bring home to the average
attorney that an old theme may be given new interest by
a different interpretation thereof and that this different
interpretation may have value to one in the business of purchasing that type of merchandise.
When we consider the difference in economic and social
backgrounds of those offering such merchandise for sale and
those purchasing the same, we are met with the inescapable
conclusion that it is the seller who stands in the inferior
bargaining position. It should be borne in mind that producers are not easy to contact; that those with authority to
purchase for radio and television are surrounded by a coterie
of secretaries and assistants; that magazine editors and publishers are not readily available to the average person. It
should also be borne in mind that writers have no way of
advertising their wares-that, as is most graphically illustrated by the present opinion, no producer, publisher, or
purchaser for radio or television, is going to buy a pig in a
poke. And, when the writer, in an earnest endeavor to sell
what he has written, conveys his idea or his different interpretation of an old idea, to such prospective purchaser, he has
lost the result of his labor, definitely and irrevocably. And,
in addition, there is no way in which he can protect himself.
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to see, or, as in this
''I won't tell you what
to pay me for it, it takes no
out what the answer will be!
exl:tmple of the practical difficulties
ov,.u..._,v,_,_,_.u;; to sell-he is not
.tuu'r"';wru in
must convey to her
the result of his efforts.
There is no
for the superfluous, even
discussion of the "law
to contracts, exand implied-in-law, and quasi-conobligations, as related to ideas and literary prop'' found in the majority opinion. In California we have
"''"'"'-'-'ll"' distinctly defining the various types of contracts
we have not been informed why those code sections are
to deal with the problem of
and literary
As a matter of fact, if I understand the majority
it finally comes down to earth and relies on those
sections. In the majority opinion we find this state: ''From what has been shown respecting the law of
and of contracts we conclude that conveyance of an
can constitute valuable consideration and can be barfor before it is disclosed to the proposed purchaser,
once it is conveyed, i.e., disclosed to him and he has
it is henceforth his own and he may work with
use it as he sees fit. In the field of entertainment the
may properly and validly agree that he will pay
the service of conveying to him ideas which are valuable
which he can put to profitable use. Furthermore, where
idea has been conveyed with the expectation by the purthat compensation will be paid if the idea is used,
is no reason why the
who has been the benethe conveyance of such an idea, and who finds it
<"'-'·"'-''" and is profiting by
may not then for the first time,
'l.btr~~nv•·tuJn he is not at that time under any legal obligation
do, promise to pay a reasonable co-mpensation for that
is, for the past service of furnishing it to himthus create a valid obligation." (Emphasis added.)
seems to me most obvious that a seller of literary work
not disclose his ideas incorporated in his work to a
n"-"'"""'''.,."m purchaser of the same without an implied under"""'uuJlH~ on the part of both that such an idea, if used by the
(lue to whom it was disclosed, would be paid for by the one
a position to use the literary work. The very positions
'n¥•r\W>HJO

j)

chaser,
without

is at
known to both
and the other to
of a department store when merchandise
counter-it is understood
the merchandise so
unnecessary for the
to state to anyone
are for sale. I am at
any different rules
should
when it is ideas for sale rather than normal
run of merchandise.
true that one need not
pay for ideas
such
are in
domain but
when those ideas have been so treated that
have worth
or value to a
it is difficult to understand why it is necessary that the
should definitely
state that he is
his merchandise to a
buyer.
It appears to me that the
should be sufficient to raise the inference that if the literary
work is used by the
would
be paid therefor
of how much
takes to decide whether he will use it.

